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LFMI hosted international libertarian forum 
 
On July 6-10 libertarian economists, philosophers, politicians, 
academics and journalists from 15 countries gathered at an 
international conference “Toward Liberty: Turning Principles into 
Reality” in Vilnius. The event was organised by the Lithuanian 
Free Market Institute (LFMI), the International Society for 
Individual Liberty, U.S.A., and the Libertarian International, 
organisation of Europe’s libertarians. Lithuanian weekly Veidas 
was an information supporter of the conference. The event was the 
22nd annual meeting of libertarians from different parts of the 
globe, people of different interests and backgrounds, all of whom 
are united by the ideas of individual liberty. 
 
The conference focused on the following issues: why totalitarian 
states survive nowadays, whether apparatchik economics is 
already the past or still the future, how we should call the 
European Union - the four freedoms or super leviathan, whether 
globalization is needed for the world, and what are the prospects 
and problems for freedom in non-western societies. It also 
addressed the issue of liberty and war with a special focus on what 
kind of order the US government is trying to implement around the 
world today and an impressive number of other topics.  
 
One of the conference days was dedicated to explore the history of 
oppression. Participants visited the Grutas Park (Stalin’s world), 
the only place in the world where an astounding amount of Soviet 
sculptures and other symbols have been turned into an open air 
museum, constructed like a Soviet lager for political dissidents. 
 
Among recognised international speakers were Mr. Hans Hermann 
Hoppe, a famous American-German philosopher; Mr. Jurij 
Maltsev, a former advisor to the M. Gorbachev Government and 
currently professor of economics at Carthage College in 
Wisconsin; Mr. Jaroslav Romanchuk, the Vice President of the 
official opposition party of Belarus; Mr. Jan Narveson, a famous 
Canadian philosopher; Ms. Elena Leontjeva, the Chair of LFMI’s 
Board, LFMI’s Senior Policy Analysts Mr. Remigijus Simasius 
and Mr. Ramunas Vilpisauskas, Lithuanian philosopher Mr. 
Algirdas Degutis, and other truly prominent speakers and 
panellists.  
 
Annual libertarian forums have played a vital role in facilitating 
the growth of the world liberty movement. Since 1982, they have 
been held in most Western European as well as in some former 
communist countries (Russia, Estonia and the Czech Republic). 
Other events took place in Mexico, Costa Rica, Canada and South 
Africa.  
 
Improving construction business rules in Lithuania 
 
On June 19 Lithuanian policy analysts, builders and government 
representatives gathered at a conference “Time to Strengthen the 
Legal Basis of the Construction Business in Lithuania: Public 
Procurement and Regulations in Construction” to discuss and find 
ways how to make construction rules and public procurement 
procedures clear and transparent and adapt them to the modern 
construction business. The event was organized by LFMI and the 
company Skanska Statyba.  
 
According to LFMI senior policy analyst Remigijus Simasius, 
even though the number of construction projects is increasing in 
Lithuania and the business is developing rapidly, modern 
construction is often distorted by existing regulations. 
“Unfortunately the rules are not clear yet and the opinion of 
particular individuals in government positions determines where, 
what and how things can be built. Innovations in organizing 
construction face regulatory barriers; public procurements do not 
allow transparency and set a bad tone for the legal environment in 
the whole construction market,” he believes. 
 
The difficulties, challenges and organizational innovations of the 
construction business were discussed at the conference. Industry 
participants discussed the problems they face when selling their 
services to the government, and representatives of state institutions 
examined public construction procurement from the customer’s 
point of view.  The question of whether it is necessary to regulate 
the construction business in detail was one topic of the conference. 
Policy analysts presented innovations that builders can look 
forward to after accession to the European Union and analyze the 
need for improvements and simplification of public procurement 
regulations. 
 
On May 3 Lithuania celebrated Tax Freedom Day 
  
LFMI has calculated that in 2003 Tax Freedom Day fell on May 3. 
This year the average Lithuanian taxpayer had to work 122 days to 
pay the total tax bill imposed by all levels of government. LFMI 
started the tradition of commemorating Tax Freedom Day in 
Lithuania in 1993. Since 1993, when the Lithuanian taxpayers 
turned to the government everything they earned until April 13, 
Tax Freedom Day has moved later in the calendar. Starting from 
2001, Tax Freedom Day comes earlier every year: on May 15 in 
2001 and on May 4 in 2002. But, in LFMI’s opinion, Lithuanians 
didn’t start paying fewer taxes. Quite the contrary. The financing 
of the state grew markedly in absolute terms, but a juicy growth of 
GDP alleviated the tax burden in relative terms. And although the 
growth of GDP build preconditions to lower the tax burden in 
Lithuania, the advantages of the strengthening economy were used 
to benefit the budget rather than the people. 
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Senior Policy Analyst of the Lithuanian Free Market Institute 
Ramunas Vilpisauskas thinks that every one of us will join our 
own imaginary EU, therefore later this understanding may 
have to be altered or one will have to become accustomed to 
the fact that some people’s lives might not change…The 
following interview was printed in weekly Atgimimas (2003 04 
25). 
 
The Market, not Funds, are Important to the EU 
Interview with Ramunas Vilpisauskas 
 
 
- What kind of challenges do you see Lithuania facing in 
the first years of EU membership? Many people are 
somewhat frightened by this uncertainty. 
 
- First I would draw the attention to the challenges faced by the 
state institutions which have a say in what impact membership 
will have on business and society itself. It is most important to 
ensure that Lithuania, having joined the EU, will not be a 
second-rate state in regard to the implementation of EU policy 
measures, those of the internal market in particular. This is a 
common fear which is partially justified keeping in mind the 
established transitional periods for politically sensitive fields 
for EU states.  
 
Equally important is the fragmentation of the internal market 
which will persist at least for some time – it should be 
remembered that border barriers will not be removed 
immediately after joining the EU. The abolition of internal 
barriers will directly depend on how Lithuania will protect its 
outside borders. Therefore, for a period of time restrictions on 
the movement of people and the exchange between old and 
new EU member states will remain, and the main challenge is 
to achieve that these restrictions are not permanent. 
 
The ongoing discussion in the EU Convention shows numerous 
intentions to further expand integration in the groups of small 
member states. In this instance, the question arises of 
Lithuanian and other nations being left out on the side. The 
debates in the Convention still demonstrate certain scepticism 
regarding EU enlargement – a desire to retain this cosy circle 
of states which will not be that cosy after the enlargement, 
while the variety of interests will increase. Dealing with this 
variety and dovetailing respect for differences among states 
and societies with the general rules governing the common 
market is the biggest challenge both for the EU and Lithuania. 
This is an enormous political challenge which means, first of 
all, the ability to define Lithuania’s interests (since former key 
goals – membership of the EU and NATO – are becoming the 
means for the implementation of so far vaguely defined 
interests) and the ability to represent Lithuanian interests inside 
the EU. During the initial years, it will be most crucial to 
balance the wish not to lag behind the integration vanguard 
with the understanding that Lithuania is less economically 
developed, that there are cultural and political differences 
which may render the implementation of certain proposed 
harmonized measures too costly.  
 
- You touched upon an important topic – the ability of 
politicians and civil servants to represent Lithuania’s 
interests. How much influence will this have on business? 
 
- There is both a direct and an indirect effect. Clearly, the 
success of the Lithuanian business in the Single market will 
depend on its abilities to compete in the first place. However, 
the Lithuanian representatives in the EU institutions and their 
ability to negotiate will also determine how quickly and 
smoothly the Lithuanian business will take advantages of the 
opportunities offered by the internal market. Will sufficient 
diplomatic efforts be put forth if the European Commission 
tends to make use of the envisaged measures of market 
protection? Will the impact of newly proposed EU norms on 
the Lithuanian business and economy be properly evaluated? 
After joining the EU and while participating in the adoption of 
new legal acts, for example, regulating environmental issues, 
the question will always arise of whether they are not too 
expensive for Lithuanian companies.  
 
Another sensitive issue is tax harmonization. If direct taxes 
were harmonised, for example, the profit tax, it is hardly 
probable that the minimum were set lower than the tariff in 
Lithuania. This would have a direct influence on business 
conditions and competitiveness. In the meantime, however, tax 
harmonisation is not very likely to happen. Business 
competitiveness will also directly depend on how strict the 
production standards – environmental protection and labour 
safety – are going to be in the future. 
 
I would also like to highlight another challenge – the ability to 
use properly EU funds without increasing taxes and without 
reducing funding of other important internal policy areas in 
Lithuania on which the EU has no direct influence (internal 
security, police, maintenance of order, reforms of the health 
care, social security and education). Even now, Lithuanian 
businesses increasingly concentrate on the EU structural funds, 
although business support is not their goal. Structural funds, as 
cynics claim, is payment to those who are discontent with what 
is happening in Europe and in the world in general, to those 
who are unable to compete. They are used to induce loyalty 
and to attract market participants’ attention to the EU.  
 
In economic terms, the primary goal of the funds is to finance 
projects that are too big for individual enterprises to undertake 
or for national budgets to finance, and which have an external 
influence, mainly on two or more member states 
(transportation infrastructure and environmental protection 
projects), but not to provide a general support for business 
which is what many in Lithuania suppose them to do. By 
putting too much emphasis on structural funds and imprudently 
distributing budget revenues, on the one hand, non-realistic 
expectations may be created and private incentives and market 
investments distorted, while on the other, too little attention 
may be paid to such areas as the health care and social security 
and the reform of these systems which are unfinished yet. 
 
- How would you evaluate business opportunities to take 
over the means of the structural funds at the outset of 
membership? What opportunities, in your opinion, do 
smaller businesses have and will this support be an impulse 
that will promote business growth? 
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- This money will not be the main impulse to business growth; 
it is just a certain aid for solving specific problems – for raising 
or changing qualification, modernization of equipment and so 
on. EU support in the EU itself is not seen as the main impulse 
to business development. Support from structural funds is 
provided for specific activities, however, the success of 
business has always depended on business itself and it will 
continue so. It is a fallacy to assume that the survival of 
enterprises and their success in competition will depend on EU 
support. EU support may help some people indeed, for 
example, business consultants, who will have more work and 
will earn more. Or it may help farmers whose income will 
increase significantly because of this support. However, EU’s 
main purpose from the outset has been and remains the creation 
of more favourable conditions for trade and exchange between 
its member nations.   
 
- Can it be stated that as a result of EU support some 
enterprises will operate at a larger profit, while others will 
encounter distorted competition? 
 
- This will probably not be a major factor in determining who 
will go bankrupt and who will hold out and compete in the 
Single market. The common market is the organization’s 
foundation. Talking of it, when a common market is created 
and the rules of economic activity are harmonised, general 
norms are most favourable for large enterprises that have 
developed economies of scale. For small enterprises this is not 
very topical. If an enterprise provides services or produces 
goods for its own town, membership of the EU may not be 
relevant in its view. 
 
Funds that are allocated for small business to some extent take 
part in solving specific business problems (lack of information, 
lack of funds for investment, etc.), and to some extent only 
show rhetorical attention. An opinion prevails in the EU itself 
that the market must decide which enterprises are able to 
complete and which are not. But not funds. However, 
providing funds can and most likely will distort competition 
and market incentives. 
 
- Does this mean that structural support is like bait – 
politicians have exalted and presented it as the primary 
reason for membership? 
 
- In essence, yes. Giving too much prominence to structural 
support does not portray the true nature of the EU. Other things 
are also given more significance than they deserve. We see 
advertisements that the EU will create new jobs and that people 
will have jobs. The EU is not related with job creation; it 
regulates economic exchange. And this is not an organization 
that rules everything in peoples’ lives.  
 
In part this means that the EU is becoming a normal object of 
political discussion, just like any other object which gives us 
trouble in finding the truth. In joining the EU, many will join 
their own organization which will differ greatly from other 
peoples’ imagined EU. This is an inevitable political 
discussion, and politicians are trying to turn, deliberately or not 
deliberately, the discussion and create an image suitable for 
them. If great expectations are created, later great 
disappointments may occur, and people will have to alter their 
understanding or get accustomed to the fact that the EU may 
not bring marked changes in some peoples’ lives because the 
biggest benefits of EU membership will not be easily expressed 
in a monetary form. 
 
- How would you evaluate the readiness of the 
administrating system to take over EU support? 
 
- It is so far difficult to evaluate this, since not everything is 
functioning yet, and I doubt that anyone in Lithuania is clear on 
how this system is going to function. Specific procedures are 
not finished yet, it is unclear how much funding will finally be 
allotted for specific areas, and requirements and rules are being 
prepared in the meantime. However, the readiness to 
administrate money in general will reflect traits and difficulties 
of public administration.  
 
It is, however, likely that because of a heightened attention of 
the society and the European Commission to these institutions, 
there may be less difficulties. This attention will force 
institutions to report for their actions more responsibly and to 
provide more information before making decisions. Of course, 
when we talk about big sums of money, there will always be 
people who will want to turn it in a direction that they desire.  
 
- How do you think the situation in the agriculture will 
change in light of modified financing? What consequences 
should be awaited? What can farmers expect? 
 
- It is hard to forecast general changes, however, it can be 
firmly stated that the production of items which will receive 
support will grow. Quotas set for a number of products, for 
example, milk, are bigger than what is produced now, and this 
will be a strong incentive for farmers to reach the level of 
quotas. In this way, the strongly-regulated common agricultural 
policy clearly builds certain expectations and encourages 
economic activity in areas where funding, rather than market 
demand, is expected. Production of items that the EU will not 
fund directly should not increase significantly. In agriculture, 
the supply of support plays larger role than the preferences of 
consumers. 
 
- However, we are talking about products that are of a 
certain quality – and quality is mainly attained in the 
largest farms. Will quality requirements and support be 
much more advantageous for larger farms? What awaits 
the smallest ones? 
 
- Large farms, whose products’ quality already meets EU 
norms, will have it easier. Small farms, which have just a 
couple of cows, may have either to invest heavily, cooperate or 
discontinue operation. But even now, their operation can hardly 
be called commercial. Agriculture is often an additional source 
of income. And those, who claim that people will not be able to 
slaughter pigs or do what they do now for their own needs, are 
wrong. No one will prohibit doing so; simply those products 
which do not meet the standards will not be supplied to the 
market. Small, or semi-subsistence farming in Lithuania is 
more of a way of life and an addition to ones’ income than a 
commercial activity which can go bankrupt in the real sense of 
the word. 
 
- Perhaps they will change the direction of their trade? 
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- It is hard to say. On the one hand, rallies and protest actions 
show that many people expect the most not from their own 
activity, but rather from what the government will decide (and 
politicians do not seek to lessen these expectations). They do 
not want to try various activities and if one fails try another, 
but rather blame the government. This shows that farmers 
associate their activity with government policies and that 
changing their profession and trying new activities is not a 
widespread phenomenon in the country side. On the other 
hand, those protesting are not the majority of rural inhabitants; 
although they represent a substantial opinion, there are other 
people who develop business, tourism and engage in 
alternative activities. Especially since part of the funding for 
agriculture is projected for the development of alternative 
activities. The very existence of these funds can entice people 
to think about a different occupation.  
 
- To what extent will support for agriculture spur the 
restructuring processes in the country side? 
 
- Probably after about three years clear results will become 
apparent. It is likely that many quotas will not be used up 
entirely. Agricultural support is quite extensive, therefore, 
many people residing in the country side will attempt to 
produce one product or another that is supported and to make 
use of the funding provided. If discussing unemployment, I 
would refrain from forecasting; besides, government policy 
will not be of less importance than EU membership; for 
example, in creating conditions for sale of land and in the 
coming of foreign investment to agriculture.  
 
Restructuring and employment will depend on people’s 
entrepreneurship and conditions for its expression. I would not 
associate membership of the EU with increased unemployment 
in agriculture. The number of people employed in agriculture 
would probably decrease; however, I am not certain that the 
existing statistical data is correct or meaningful. Suppose, 
those, who out of different motives want to emphasize their 
activity, claim that agriculture may contain up to one-third of 
the work force. However, those people can continue residing in 
agricultural areas, but take up a different activity. 
 
Supposing that the number of the employed decreases, 
naturally, the question of what other people will be doing 
arises. Part of the people will be of the retirement age, so they 
will not be formally employed, others will attempt to develop 
other activities funded by the EU, and others can set off for 
seasonal employment in other EU member states or attempt to 
change their profession.  
 
 
Interviewed by Giedre Bielskyte 
 
 
   
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following paper was delivered by Lithuanian philosopher 
Mr. Algirdas Degutis, the first advocate of libertarian ideas in 
Lithuania. He is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Culture, 
Philosophy and Art (Vilnius). He has translated into 
Lithuanian some major works in the classical-liberal tradition, 
including those of John Locke, Frederic Bastiat, Friedrich A. 
Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, Milton Friedman and others. Mr. 
Degutis is also author of the books: Language, Thought and 
Reality (1984), A Country of State Racket (1993), and 
Individualism and Social Order (1998). 
Frontiers of the Libertarian - Statist 
Controversy: the Case of Globalization 
Algirdas Degutis 
Whatever one defines globalization – as the grand process of 
the “compression of space and time” or as the world’s 
becoming a “global village” or simply as an “increase in 
international trade and investment” – one wonders what’s the 
fuss about it, and, in particular, what is it about it that incites 
the anger of the crowds of “anti-globalists.” 
Globalisation is inevitable  
Both in popular and in academic writings globalization has 
often been portrayed as an unavoidable and irreversible 
process, which is rolling over us like some major natural 
phenomenon drastically reshaping our lives. Says Thomas 
Friedman: „Globalization isn’t a choice, it’s a reality“, it is like 
the dawn: “even if I didn’t care much for the dawn there isn’t 
much I could do about it.”1 The analogy with the rising of the 
sun suggests inevitability – a widely held perception about 
globalization. For others it is like the dusk, certain to occur, 
whether we like it or not. Both for those who lament it and for 
those who celebrate it, says Bauman, “‘globalization’ is the 
intractable fate of the world, an irreversible process.”2 
Referring to the alleged erosion of the nation-state by 
transnational forces Bauman tells us: „Its causes are not fully 
understood; it cannot be exactly predicted even if the causes 
are known; and it certainly cannot be prevented from 
happening even if predicted.“3 Assuming that globalization is 
the march of international capitalism, Francis Fukuyama 
famously argued for the grand view that Western free-market 
capitalism, or liberal democracy, is the final end of history, that 
there is a fundamental process at work that dictates a common 
evolutionary pattern for all societies. In other words, the 
teleological goal of world history is world-wide free-market 
capitalism. Because of this globalization is the end of history, 
whatever are the ends we as individuals or groups of 
individuals might pursue. 
                                                 
1 Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor Books, 
1999), xxii. 
2 Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998, p. 1. 
3 op.cit., p. 41. 
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A more specific variant of the inevitability view is that 
globalization arises primarily from technological progress in 
such areas as communications and data processing. “What 
explains this globalization?” asks John Williamson,∗ “It is 
certainly not attributable to conquest, the source of most 
previous historical episodes where a single economic system 
has held sway over a vast geographical terrain. The source lies 
instead in the development of technology. The costs of 
transport, of travel, and above all the costs of communicating 
information have fallen dramatically in the post-war period, 
almost entirely because of the progress of technology.”4 
 
This picture of globalization is based upon the curious view of 
it as possessing agency in itself. As Justin Rosenberg argued, in 
this picture globalization as the explanandum is transformed 
into the explanans.5 But it is hard to conceive globalization as 
an agent in itself without lapsing into wild speculations of 
historicism and determinism. If there is agency here it cannot 
reside in globalization itself, or in the globalizing process, but 
rather in the human agents involved in globalization, that is, in 
the usual loci of decision making and responsibility. It is more 
plausible to say that globalization has been pushed by 
developments in technology (or even pulled by Fukuyama’s 
telos of history) but that ultimately it has been due to human 
choice, to monumental political changes. 
 
To a large extent, we have globalization simply because 
governments around the world have deliberately chosen to 
remove barriers within, and around, their markets, which have 
impeded domestic and international trade. The global 
integration we have today results from political decisions by 
sovereign states – taken at the national level to liberalize 
domestic markets – and at the international level to enter into 
agreements to liberalize foreign trade. Technological progress 
has only facilitated globalization processes set in motion by 
privatization and liberalization policies, pioneered by the “new 
right” US and British governments from the early 1970s to the 
early 1980s (and culminating in the so-called ‘Washington 
Consensus’ of 1989). 
 
Within a short time since 1980s the mainstream political 
parties around the world began to adopt similar policies or to 
continue policies designed to implement the vision of the "new 
right", dubbed by critics as ‘neoliberalism.’ Even where “new 
right” parties were replaced in power with social-democratic 
ones the new governments eventually proved to be as 
committed to ‘neoliberalism’ as their political opposites. This 
has been the case more or less around the world. Neoliberalism 
has increasingly come to appear as a set of ideas whose time 
has come, while socialism, social democracy and the 
Keynesian welfare state have begun to appear more and more 
out of date. In the words of a bitter left-wing critic of this 
development, Pierre Bourdieu,∗ now it is the case that 
“neoliberal discourse is not just one discourse among many. 
Rather, it is a "strong discourse" – the way psychiatric 
                                                 
∗ He is the man who coined the label ‘Washington Consensus’ for the 
international policy consensus of 1989, the consensus which is now conceived 
by anti-globalists as a conspiracy of global capitalism. 
4 Williamson, John, Globalization: The Concept, Causes and Consequences, 
1998. 
5 Rosenberg, J., The Follies of Globalisation Theory, Verso, 2000. 
∗ He was one of the main figures in ATTAC, a major anti-globalization 
organization based in France. 
discourse is in an asylum …. It is so strong and so hard to 
combat only because it has on its side all of the forces of a 
world of relations of forces, a world that it contributes to 
making what it is.”6 
 
Ultimately, globalization is the result of a political choice, not 
an external process constraining that choice. And this is 
confirmed by the fact that in today’s globalization we are 
witnessing something that strikingly resembles the famous 
description: 
 
The bourgeoisie has … given a cosmopolitan character to 
production and consumption in every country. To the great 
chagrin of reactionaries, it has drawn from under the feet of 
industry the national ground on which it stood. … In place of 
the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we 
have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence 
of nations. … National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness 
become more and more impossible … The bourgeoisie, by the 
rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the 
immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, 
even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap 
prices of commodities are the heavy artillery with which it 
forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to 
capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to 
adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to 
introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to 
become bourgeois themselves.7 
We actually live in the second rather than the first age of 
globalization. The first age globalization of the 19th and early 
20th centuries, ushered in by the liberal ideology of laissez-
faire that opened the gates for remarkable technical progress 
and in turn was driven by it, was largely reversed during the 
1920s and 1930s, again by political decisions, with dramatic 
consequences for the world, even though technical progress 
continued its forward march. 
Thus technological determinism is a fallacy today, as it was 
yesterday. Another fallacy is the idea made famous by Karl 
Polanyi in his book The Great Transformation (1944) and 
refurbished today, namely that the disasters of the 20th century 
can be traced back to the evils of unfettered laissez-faire. Brink 
Lindsay has convincingly argued that this is an almost perfect 
inversion of the truth. The disasters of the 20th century 
stemmed not from an over-reliance on markets, but from a 
pervasive loss of faith in them. The demise of the first age of 
globalization was due to a powerful new idea taking hold and 
remaking the world in its image. That idea, according to 
Lindsay, was that the economic revolution of industrialization 
both enabled and required a revolution in social organization: 
the eclipse, partial or total, of markets and competition by 
centralized, top-down control. In the early decades of the 20th 
century the rise of collectivism spelled the demise of the first 
global economy; while in the past couple of decades, the loss 
of faith in the collectivist dream has allowed globalization to 
                                                 
6 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Essence of Neoliberalism”, Le Monde diplomatique, 
December, 1998. 
7 K Marx and F Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Phoenix edn (London, 
1996), p. 8-9. 
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resume its course. The death of the dream of centralized 
control in the 1980s has marked the rebirth of globalization.8 
The Realignment 
The 1970s and 1980s were indeed the watershed decades. The 
1970s witnessed stagflation and near bankruptcy of the 
Keynesian welfare state, the 1980s saw the beginning of the 
end of the systems of statist economic planning in the countries 
of real socialism, and, finally, the adoption around the world of 
pro-market policies whose principle was the acceptance of the 
superiority of systems based on private property and markets. 
The decades signified the beginning of what has been called 
the triumph of capitalism. The dismantling of “progressive” 
social and economic reforms, which – in the eyes of the left – 
had brought some degree of "social justice" to capitalism, 
began in earnest. The state was increasingly portrayed as a 
behemoth strangling the productive incentives and the 
discipline of the market; and welfare policies were exposed as 
ultimately counter-productive: “The disillusion with socialism 
and other forms of collectivism, which became the dominant 
spirit of the 1980s, was only one aspect of a much wider loss of 
faith in the state as an agency of benevolence. The state was, 
up to the 1980s, the great gainer of the twentieth century; and 
the central failure.”9 “We tried to provide more for the poor 
and produced more poor instead.”10 The welfare state came 
under attack in theory and practice. At the same time social 
democracy, its chief protagonist, began to lose its political pull, 
and to adopt policies and programs similar to those of the 
conservative or “new right” parties. The balance of political 
forces moved to the right of the centre. 
A rapprochement took place. For the earlier socialist ideology 
the welfare state was a half-way house to the ultimate socialist 
society. But in the new intellectual and political environment 
“in many countries what remains of socialist ideology has 
become concentrated on protecting the welfare state against the 
attacks of the neoliberals.”11 On the other hand, the “new right” 
ideology, though on the ascendance, had to concede the 
truncated welfare state as a half-way house to the ultimate 
capitalist society. And over this issue of a glass of water – was 
it half empty or half full? – a realignment took place: all 
politics moved closer together and political choice increasingly 
became not so much a choice of substance as a choice of style. 
If this was at least a partial victory for the ‘new right’ and a 
cause of some rejoice for them, it was at least a partial defeat 
for the ‘truly’ left and was experienced by them as painful. 
Pierre Bourdieu complained: “the power of neoliberalism is so 
overwhelming that it's being implemented by people who call 
themselves socialists. Whether it's Schröder, Blair or Jospin, 
these are people who practice neoliberal politics in the name of 
socialism.”12 Another left-wing critic, commenting on the 
                                                 
8 “The Decline and Fall of the First Global Economy”, Reason, December 
2001. 
9 Johnson, P., Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Nineties, 
Harper Collins Publishers: New York, 1991, p. 783. 
10 Murray, Ch., Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980, Basic 
Books, 1984, p. 9. 
11 Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right, Stanford University Press, 1994, 
p. 17. 
12 Die Zeit, January 2000. 
“third way” of today’s social democracy, has this to say: “New 
Labour has shifted so far to the centre that the party represents 
merely a warmed-over Thatcherism. The Euro-American Third 
Way articulated by Prime Minister Anthony Blair and 
practiced, if not preached, by President Clinton, German Prime 
Minister Schröder, and the prime ministers of other Western 
European regimes provides a rhetorical gloss over a new style 
of right-wing politics. Essentially, the Euro-American variant 
of the Third Way builds on and extends the Old Right 
Thatcher-Reagan doctrines of privatization and the promotion 
of concentrated, centralized capital.”13 However far-fetched 
this description might seem from the libertarian point of view, 
it is quite characteristic of the principled left’s perception of the 
political development. 
Globalization as an Excuse  
An important feature of the political realignment was that 
politicians of various stripes have acquired the habit of 
pointing to the increasingly global economy in order to justify 
unpopular political choices. "These are the demands of global 
economy" has become a favourite excuse and an alibi for a 
policy lacking wide support. This talk of globalisation as 
something objectively out there, imposing constraints on 
governments, rather than reflecting the choices they made, has 
been a particularly useful ploy for the reformed left. Having 
lost the battle of ideas they were eager to find a face-saving 
devise for their new opportunism. As The Economist explains 
(in my nearly verbatim rendering), the failure of the welfare 
state in the 1970s and the follow-up collapse of communism 
led to a monumental crisis of self-confidence on the left. So 
changes in left-wing parties’ rhetoric followed. The leaders of 
the new left could hardly expect to retain the loyalty of 
traditionalists if they came out and said: ‘Most of what we used 
to assert is wrong. Now that we have been found out, we are 
going to the other side. From now on we stand for a kinder, 
gentler, more compassionate sort of conservatism.’ Instead, to 
appeal to centrist voters, while at the same time flattering 
traditionalists into believing their ideas still prevailed, they put 
it another way: “The world has changed, our values have not” 
(Blair). The idea that politics determines national policies has 
gradually dissipated, and in its place has come the idea that 
global economy is the crucial factor in more and more aspects 
of society: “It’s the economy, stupid” (attributed to Clinton). In 
all kinds of way governments and their political opponents 
used the supposed demands of globalisation to deny 
responsibility. But there is a price for the ploy. With the 
political options for government seemingly narrowed, a 
corresponding growth in political apathy and scepticism about 
politics and politicians was bound to emerge. “The denial of 
responsibility, the pretence that policies are dictated by global 
markets rather than chosen by elected governments, the refusal 
to consider alternatives … was bound to persuade many people 
that conventional politics is indeed a waste of time.”14 
 
                                                 
13 James Petras, “The Third Way: Myth and Reality”, Monthly Review, March, 
2000. 
14 “Globalization and its Critics: A Survey of Globalization”, The Economist, 
September 29, 2001, p. 24. 
 7
Backlash against Globalisation 
The growing scepticism about politics and politicians was 
accompanied by, and possibly even led to, another 
development – the rise of the anti-globalization movement. As 
could be expected, the globalization ploy was soon exposed as 
a conspiracy on the part of politicians and pundits operating at 
the international level and acting in the interests of global 
capital. And it could be expected that international meetings, 
summits, international treaties and bodies such as NAFTA, 
IMF and WTO were to become central targets of attack by 
those disenchanted with national politics. It was also natural 
that having lost the conventional political venues and being 
merely “anti-” and suspicion-driven, the protests took to the 
streets, with protestors employing action directe, usually 
bursting out into violence and vandalism. “Taken together, the 
string of protests since Seattle in 1999, which have torn 
through Washington, Melbourne, Prague, Seoul, Nice, 
Barcelona, Washington DC, Quebec City, Gothenburg and 
Genoa, have cost more than $250m in security precautions, 
damage and lost business. Hundreds have been injured, several 
shot and one young man has been killed.”15 More importantly, 
they put the neoliberal establishment on the defensive. It is no 
longer possible to be blandly sure of the inevitability of 
globalization.  
 
The movement is a loose collection of disparate groups with 
different and even incompatible objectives. They have no 
common position, or if there is a common position, it is best 
described as being anti-capitalist. Strictly speaking, this is not 
an "anti-globalisation" movement, for the vast majority of the 
groups have global agendas. In essence, this is a global 
movement against global capitalism. It is driven by the 
suspicion that corporations, in their strive for profits, are riding 
slipshod over the public interest, are exploiting the poor, are 
imposing standards of consumption on unwilling consumers, 
are subjecting to the cash-nexus (commodifying) ‘higher’ 
social and cultural values, are ravaging the environment, etc., 
etc. And it is fuelled by the fear that democracy has become 
powerless to stop them, since politicians and international 
political institutions are thought to be serving corporate 
agendas. As in the Communist Manifesto 150 years ago, the 
idea is that “the executive of the modern state is but a 
committee for managing the common affairs of the whole 
bourgeoisie.” 
 
Fallacious Assumptions Underlying Anti-Globalisation 
One of these assumptions has already been referred to above. 
This is the idea that people have been disempowered by global 
capitalism that concentrates its power in distant undemocratic 
institutions like WTO. This is generally wrong (whatever 
libertarian objections to inter-governmental organizations in 
general). In particular, this is wrong in respect of WTO, 
because WTO is an inter-governmental, rather that supra-
governmental body, a kind of an arbitration mechanism, and its 
rules are adopted by the consensus of member governments. 
Blame for policies pursued by particular governments, if laid at 
                                                 
15 James Harding, “The Anti-Globalization Movement”, Financial Times, 
October 15, 2001. 
the door of WTO, is quite inappropriate, since membership in it 
is their own choice. The critics are barking up the wrong tree. 
What the critics of globalization portray as a conspiracy of 
secretive international bureaucracies is in fact the spread of 
pro-market policies in nation states. 
Now, globalization is simply free trade writ large. Thus all the 
arguments for free trade are arguments for globalization. (And 
arguments against globalization are arguments against free 
trade.) The advantages of a global economy based on free trade 
are so obvious and enormous that it is difficult to conceive of 
anyone with an inkling of economic understanding opposing it. 
The advantages is a corollary of Adam Smith’s axiom of the 
mutual benefit of voluntary trade and of the law of comparative 
advantage: every country becomes more prosperous the more it 
invests in producing and exporting what it does best (in terms 
of cost or quality), and importing what other countries can 
produce more efficiently. Attempts at keeping (or imposing) a 
country’s self-sufficiency are wasteful of resources, a sure way 
of keeping (or making) a country poorer than it would have 
been in having its markets open. 
The market process of Schumpeterian “creative destruction” 
brought about by free trade is the most powerful wealth-
creating mechanism humanity has ever invented. The process 
is ‘cruel’, but only in the sense that we ourselves, as 
consumers, are cruel in picking out (paying to) those who serve 
us best. However, even losers in the short run gain in the longer 
run, since their activities are redirected to more efficient uses 
and since they gain from the cheaper products, made available 
by the more efficient producers.  
Anti-globalists’ criticism of the global march of capitalism is 
commonly based on the failure to recognize that all market 
exchange is a positive sum game. Instead, the critics assume 
that there is a fixed pie, and that one party can gain only at the 
expense of the other (as in a zero-sum game), so that if the rich 
are getting richer in (global) trade, then the poor must be 
getting poorer. Trade liberalization (market competition) is 
treated as opening the floodgates to the Darwinian struggle for 
survival. No wonder that market relations, trading and profit 
seeking are then conceived in terms of predation and violence. 
Indicative of this are the titles of some influential anti-
globalization books: Bourdieu, Acts of Resistance: Against the 
Tyranny of the Market; Falk, Predatory Globalization; Viviane 
Forrester, L'Horreur économique; Bové, The World is not for 
Sale; Martin and Schumann, The Globalization Trap. 
Bourdieu tells us about ‘structural violence’ committed by the 
market order: “The ultimate foundation of this entire economic 
order placed under the sign of freedom is in effect the 
structural violence of unemployment” (“The Essence of 
Neoliberalism”). This seems to imply that a person commits an 
act of violence by refusing to employ an applicant for a job. 
Ironically, this seems also to imply that the consummation of 
the Marxist struggle against the exploitation of labour is a ban 
on the exploiters to desist with their exploitation. 
Related to this fallacy is that of ‘profits versus public interest’ 
argument (as exemplified, e.g. by J. H. Mittelman.16 He 
                                                 
16 The Globalization Syndrome, Princeton UP, 2000. 
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stresses the tensions inherent in globalization between the 
“powerful thrust of globalizing market forces" and "a 
counterthrust fuelled by the needs of society" (p. 3). This is an 
all too familiar refrain: ‘market forces’ stand opposed to ‘the 
needs of society’. How ‘market forces’ can flourish without 
satisfying at least some of these needs remains, as usual, 
unexplained. Still, to be tamed are the ‘market forces’, not ‘the 
needs of society’, for presumably the author knows them better 
than those who cater for them in the market. 
A corollary of this is the elitist view of choices made in the 
market: the idea is that most consumers’ choices are wrong, 
uninformed or misinformed, and in either case that their 
choices are being manipulated and manufactured by the all-
powerful corporations. The paternalism of this view is matched 
only by the implicit ascription to the corporations of powers 
they could possess only in a world populated by utter fools. 
This view is the common assumption of lamentations on the 
evils of ‘commodification’, ‘consumerism’ and 
McDonaldization, and it seems to be a major source of anti-
Americanism. 
Related to this fallacy is the confusion of market power with 
political power. E.g. Noreena Hertz17 point to the fact that out 
of the top 100 economies in the world, 51 are not countries but 
businesses, insinuating that some corporations are now more 
powerful than some states. However, market power is totally 
benign: it is simply a reflection of a firm’s ability of serving its 
customers well. Calls for the curbing of the power of 
corporations are thus ultimately calls for the revision of the 
choices made by people in the market. And this can only lead 
to the increase of state power – the power that is malignant if 
extended beyond the very limited domain of property rights’ 
enforcement and redress. Corruption – the vice for which 
businesses are usually blamed – is the natural result of the 
extension of state’s powers beyond its proper domain. 
Then we have what David Henderson calls the “presumption of 
remediable injustice.” The presumption is that any inequality is 
a proof of injustice done that can and should be remedied by 
“deliverance from above.” The poor are thus the ‘victims’ (the 
‘deprived,’ the ‘disadvantaged,’ the ‘excluded,’ the 
‘marginalized,’ the ‘disenfranchised’). The rich are the culprits 
(presumably because of getting away with much bigger slices 
of the fixed pie). A striking example of the remedies proposed 
is that of Susan George, a leading anti-globalization writer. She 
is concerned with the “closing the North-South gap” and with 
the “redistribution to all the people who have been robbed over 
the past twenty years.” Now, the solution is right at hand: 
“there is plenty of money sloshing around out there and a tiny 
fraction, a ridiculous, infinitesimal proportion of it would be 
enough to provide a decent life to every person on earth, to 
supply universal health and education, to clean up the 
environment and prevent further destruction to the planet, to 
close the North-South gap – at least according to the UNDP 
which calls for a paltry $40 billion a year. That, frankly, is 
peanuts.”18 
                                                 
17 The Silent Takeover, 2001. 
18 “A Short History of Neoliberalism”, 1999. 
Apparently, it has never crossed the author’s mind that this 
kind of “deliverance from above” would exacerbate the 
problems of the South – for the simple reason that the real 
causes of poverty, such as the lack of rule of law, lack of 
respect for private property, collectivism, corruption and war, 
are internal to the situation in the countries concerned. Giving 
the money to these countries would perpetuate their 
impoverishment by making it worthwhile for them to remain in 
their situation – the more so because the money would have to 
go to governments pursuing most destructive policies, since 
their countries would be most qualified for aid. 
Indeed, this belief in the “deliverance from above” is a 
Northern counterpart of the “cargo cult” prevalent in the South. 
(“All Third World ideologies are ‘cargo cults’”, as Peter Bauer 
told us in his book The Development Frontier, Harvard UP, 
1991, p. 203). The notion that poor countries cannot progress 
without aid (without ‘cargo’) derives from the incoherent 
hypothesis (assumed by of the vicious circle of poverty and 
stagnation – that one (a country) cannot get richer without 
being rich in the first place. (George Monbiot: “unless you first 
build up the wealth of local communities and business, people 
simply cannot compete with multinational capital”19). Bare 
money transfers from North cannot lift the South from the mire 
of poverty. Trade, not aid, is the solution.  
Finally, if there is anything that unites anti-globalists apart 
from their hatred of capitalism, it is their concern about 
“democracy deficit in the global economy.”20 Now, if 
liberalization means anything it means the ousting of politics 
(democratic or otherwise) from market transactions. The 
feeling of a “democracy deficit in the global economy” can 
only be understood as longing for the reintroduction, on the 
global level, of those state controls that have been lost at the 
national level. “Only a framework of global regulation ... can 
enable the creativity of the world economy to be harnessed in 
the service of human needs."21 Again, market forces are to be 
harnessed and tamed: if not in the name of the needs of a 
particular society, then in the name of human needs. 
Despairing of the chances to realize their collectivist agendas at 
the national level, the anti-globalists are now going 
international and global, just as Marxist revolutionaries did in 
early 20th century. 
 
The great difference between the “new right” revolution of the 
1980s and the contemporary anti-capitalist backlash is that the 
former started in the world of ideas, while the latter is driven 
largely by emotions and crude misconception of the nature of 
capitalism. This may prove to be fatal to the future of the 
movement, unless it comes up with a plausible theoretical 
alternative to capitalism. So far none has been presented. In a 
sombre moment of self-reflection a critic of capitalist 
globalization raises a simple question: “If suddenly handed the 
world, would we know what to do with it? Could we avoid 
chaos?”22 and, significantly, leaves it without answer. 
 
Susan George is perceptive: “one explanation for this triumph 
of neo-liberalism … is that neo-liberals have bought and paid 
                                                 
19 Interview with ephemera, May 2002. 
20 Lori Wallach, interviewed in Foreign Policy, Spring 2000. 
21 John Gray, False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism, p. 199. 
22 Sam Gindin, op.cit. 
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for their own vicious and regressive "Great Transformation." 
They have understood, as progressives have not, that ideas 
have consequences. Starting from a tiny embryo at the 
University of Chicago with the philosopher-economist 
Friedrich von Hayek and his students like Milton Friedman at 
its nucleus, the neo-liberals and their funders have created a 
huge international network of foundations, institutes, research 
centres, publications, scholars, writers and public relations 
hacks to develop, package and push their ideas and doctrine 
relentlessly.”23  
 
Indeed, this is the recipe for action that friends of individual 
liberty should heed in fighting today’s backlash against 
capitalist globalization. 
 
 
References, if not otherwise indicated, are references to WWW sites, without 
precise addresses. You can find them by using Google search machine.- 
Algirdas Degutis 
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